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Abstract 
We investigate the relationship between aggregate household debt and aggregate health 
outcomes across 17 European countries over the period 1995 to 2012. Using a dataset of country-
level standardized and objective measures of household debt, health outcomes and a rich set of 
control variables, we estimate an instrumental variable (GMM) model to address possible reverse 
causality concerns. We find that aggregate household debt affects health outcomes, and that this 
varies by the maturity of debt. Both short and medium-term debt has a positive effect on health 
outcomes. Long-term unsecured debt and mortgage debt are associated with poorer health 
outcomes. These findings are robust after controlling for alternative measures of health and debt. 
Overall, the results suggest that aggregate household debt is an important determinant of 
aggregate health outcomes across countries.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Europe, Debt burden, Debt maturity, Health outcomes, Generalized Methods of 
Moments, Cross-country data. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade household debt has risen to record levels in many countries (Guiso 
& Sodini, 2013). Between 1995 and 2008, the real value of consumer debt expanded by 
approximately 150% in Europe. In the US, consumer debt grew by approximately 60% during 
the same period, albeit from a much higher base level (Chmelar, 2013). These trends are also 
common to most industrialized countries, albeit there is some variation in overall debt levels 
over the business cycle (Sutherland & Hoeller, 2012).  
 Prior literature suggests that as well as socio-economic determinants (such as education, 
income and wealth), household debt plays a role in influencing health outcomes (Jacoby, 2002). 
High debt repayments can act as a source of anxiety leading to psychological distress and poor 
mental and physical health, which in turn may worsen financial welfare (Berger et al., 2013; 
Choi, 2009; Drentea & Lavrakas, 2000; Keese & Schmitz, 2014; Matthews & Gallo, 2011). 
Stress caused by debt can lead to an increase in unhealthy behaviours, such as smoking, 
excessive alcohol consumption and poor dietary habits (Bailis et al., 2001; Drentea & Lavrakas, 
2000; Gathergood, 2012). Indebted households may accrue further debt to pay for necessities and 
are more likely to reduce spending on high quality goods and services including food and health 
care. Debt can also reduce the availability of future resources for healthcare investments and lead 
to a vicious cycle where greater debt can be both a cause and consequence of poor health 
(Jacoby, 2002).  
To the best of our knowledge, previous literature only offers limited evidence (confined 
to the US), which suggests that short-term debt has a significant impact on health relative to 
long-term debt (Drentea & Lavrakas, 2000). In the absence of cross-country empirical evidence, 
we construct an unbalanced panel of European countries over the period 1995 to 2012 to 
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examine whether aggregate household debt affects national health outcomes, and whether any 
impact varies by the maturity of debt (short-, medium-, long-term unsecured debt and mortgage 
debt). In order to capture the ability of households to meet future expenses or absorb financial 
shocks, we focus our analysis on household debt as a percentage of Gross Disposable Income 
(GDI). This relative measure of aggregate household debt burden is often interpreted as a sign of 
financial vulnerability (Barba & Pivetti, 2009). Drawing on insights afforded by previous 
research, our measures of health outcomes at country level include years of life expectancy at 
birth and premature mortality indicators (Kennelly et al., 2003; Or, 2000; Or et al., 2005). The 
use of these country-level health indicators complements and augments previous research, which 
uses self-reported health conditions from surveys conducted for individual countries.  
 By way of preview, our results suggest that debt maturity affects health outcomes. In 
particular, we find that both the short and medium-term aggregated household debt burden 
appears to have a beneficial effect on health. Based on these findings, we contend that greater 
access to short and medium-term debt allows households to respond quickly to unexpected 
financial shocks, and consequently enjoy better health. However, the long-term burden of 
unsecured debt (for consumption purposes) and mortgage debt appear to lead to deterioration in 
health outcomes. The negative effect of debt on health is likely to impact on households’ 
capacity to generate future income, which in turn could leave households vulnerable to future 
income shocks and hence put health at risk. The results remain robust after dealing with: the 
possible endogenous nature of household debt; using different measures of debt and health 
outcomes; and controlling for traditional factors that affect health. 
 Our work contributes to the established literature in a number of ways. First, by using 
data which includes standardized measures of health outcomes and household debt, this is the 
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first study to provide cross-country evidence that debt maturity affects health outcomes. As such, 
our findings identify empirical regularities across countries with respect to the relationship 
between debt and health. Second, the use of aggregate data allows us to compare our results with 
survey data based on self-reported health measures in particular countries. Third, given that debt 
can be both a cause and an effect of poor health outcomes, we use instrumental variable 
techniques to deal with this type of endogeneity problem where household debt could depend on 
health outcomes. 
 Overall, this paper represents a first attempt to provide cross-country empirical evidence 
in relation to the link between debt and health. The findings of this study should be of interest to 
government agencies tasked with the design and execution of policy initiatives that target health 
outcomes in conjunction with debt advice, and financial literacy programmes to help consumers 
better manage debt related issues. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a 
review of salient literature. In Section 3, the empirical model and the data set used are discussed. 
Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, while Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
 The observed increase in household debt across countries could have both positive and 
negative effects on the economy. Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) and Cecchetti et al. (2011) show 
that increased household debt could lead to an increase in economic growth. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that highly leveraged households can become more vulnerable in terms of 
their capacity to service debt in the face of unexpected income falls or macroeconomic shocks as 
loans fall due for repayment (Guiso & Sodini, 2013; Jappelli & Pagano, 1989). This in turn could 
lead to a decline in consumption and reduce economic growth.  
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A small literature extends the aforementioned research to examine the relationship 
between household debt and health outcomes. Münster et al. (2009) find that over-indebtedness 
in Germany is negatively associated with physical health. Evidence also suggests that debt can 
result in a decline in physical health due to socio-economic hardship and material deprivation 
(Cohen et al., 2007; Reading & Reynolds, 2001). 
The common use of subjective data in the analyses of household debt and health could 
pose difficulties in drawing cross-country comparisons and identifying empirical regularities 
across countries (Or, 2000). Grafova (2007) uses US survey data covering the period 1999-2003 
finds a positive association between unhealthy behaviours and debt. Bridges and Disney (2010) 
find a positive association between self-reported credit card debt and depression in the UK for 
the period of 1999-2005. Keese and Schmitz (2014) use national survey data from Germany 
between 1999-2009 to analyse the association between household debt and self-reported health 
outcomes. The authors find indebtedness impacts adversely on physical and mental health. Using 
UK household survey data from 1991- 2008, Gathergood (2012) finds that adverse psychological 
effects of high debt results from the perceived social stigma associated with over-indebtedness. 
Sweet et al. (2013) investigate the relationship between self-reported debt and health using 
secondary data from 8,400 respondents in four national survey waves between 1994 and 2008 in 
the US. The authors find that high financial debt relative to available assets is associated with 
greater perceived stress, depression and poorer self-reported general health. 
As discussed above, previous research suggests that debt can lead to detrimental changes 
in mental and physical health. However, only a small number of papers have been concerned 
about the bias introduced by the potential reverse causation from health to debt (Gathergood, 
2012). For example, an unexpected health shock might increase demand for debt in order to 
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cover day-to-day expenses. Keese and Schmitz (2014) use a subsample of individuals who were 
employed continuously during the sample period of their study to reduce problems of reverse 
causality. By doing this, the authors exclude all those who possibly lost their job or left the 
labour market due to health problems at least once in the observation period and who then might 
subsequently have problems in repaying debt. The authors find a strong correlation between 
different measures of household indebtedness and health satisfaction, mental health, and obesity. 
One of the widely explored aspects in previous literature is the effect of aggregate 
household debt on economic growth and macroeconomic stability. There is a recent strand of 
literature that investigates the effects of macroeconomic conditions on health (Deaton, 2012; 
Miller et al., 2009; Ruhm, 2000, 2013). A number of longitudinal studies based on national 
household surveys find that (surprisingly) health improves during economic downturns, and 
worsens during economic expansions. Changes in behaviour due to loss of employment lead to 
changes in lifestyle and, thus, could explain observed declines in mortality rates, tobacco and 
alcohol consumption and physical inactivity during economic downturns. This results in better 
physical health (Ruhm, 2005). In addition, poorer general health, following an economic upturn 
(which is accompanied with increased employment), may result from physical injures in 
hazardous working conditions, physical exertions of employment, reduced time spent on health-
producing activities and engagement in high risk activities and behaviours (Gerdtham & Ruhm, 
2006).  
During the most recent financial crisis, evidence suggests that health status declined due 
to increased stress. Currie and Tekin (2011) investigate the impact of the financial crisis on 
health by modelling the relationship between foreclosure activity and health in four US states 
between 2005 and 2009. The study finds that there are more non-elective hospitalisations and 
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emergency room visits during the period associated with increased foreclosures. Gili et al. (2013) 
examine the association between recession and diagnosed mood and anxiety disorders, and find 
similar negative effects of foreclosure on health in Spain between 2006 and 2010.  
In reviewing salient literature, two apparent gaps emerge. First, empirical evidence is 
restricted to single country settings, which largely rely on subjective measures of debt and health 
(drawn from survey evidence on self-reported health status and socio-economic characteristics). 
While such evidence provides valuable insights for policy makers in a given jurisdiction, it does 
not provide the necessary information to assess the impact of debt on health in a cross-country 
context. Consequently, it is difficult to identify empirical regularities across countries with 
respect to the debt-health nexus. A second gap is that the established literature takes no account 
of the role of debt maturity in explaining health outcomes. This is somewhat surprising given 
that short- and/or medium-term debt can aid households by lessening the impact of short-to-
medium-term liquidity constraints arising from unexpected income shocks. By contrast, long-
term unsecured debt along with mortgage debt might be considered a drain on households and 
exacerbate physical and mental health problems (Drentea & Lavrakas, 2000; Turunen & 
Hiilamo, 2014).  
Based on the aforementioned insights, the rest of this paper uses standardised comparable 
macroeconomic data to investigate the relationship between household debt, debt maturity and 
health outcomes for an unbalanced panel of European countries over the period 1995 to 2012. 
We utilise instrumental variable techniques to deal with possible reverse causality between 
health outcomes and household debt. 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data  
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Our data set comprises an unbalanced panel of European countries covering the period 
1995-2012. The data used to construct the health outcomes variables is from the OECD Health 
Database. This database provides high quality and homogenous data that allows for comparisons 
in health outcomes across countries. Measures of health outcomes include years of life 
expectancy at birth and premature mortality (from all causes of death). Life expectancy at birth 
indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at 
the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Potential years of life lost (PYLL) 
is a summary measure of premature mortality (all causes of death per 100000 population aged 0-
69 years old) and provides an explicit way of weighting deaths occurring at younger ages, which 
are, a priori, preventable. Life expectancy at birth provides relevant information for the two most 
vulnerable groups of the population, while premature mortality is considered as a comparable 
measure of health in cross-country studies (Or et al., 2005). These measures are objective, 
accurate and comparable across countries (despite measurement problems in capturing general 
health status at macroeconomic level). 
The data on household debt is from the Statistical Package on Lending to Households 
published by the European Credit Research Institute (ECRI). The standardization of the ECRI 
database in terms of definitions and monetary aggregates (collected from national authorities, 
financial institutions and central banks) facilitates comparisons over time and between countries 
(Jappelli et al., 2013; Kösters et al., 2004; Sassi & Gasmi, 2014). The entire retail loan market, 
including aggregate data on consumer credit (unsecured debt) and mortgage debt (secured debt) 
to households in Europe are covered by the ECRI database. Consumer credit comprises loans 
related to credit cards as well as overdrafts. It also includes loans for special purposes such as 
debt consolidation, education and the purchase of securities. A unique characteristic of ECRI 
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database is the disclosure of the maturity profile of household unsecured debt across countries. A 
breakdown by maturity includes short-term unsecured debt (less than one year), medium-term 
unsecured debt (between one and five years) and long-term unsecured debt (of greater than five 
years). Mortgage debt corresponds to the outstanding amounts of loans granted by financial 
intermediaries to households for housing purposes. Household debt variables are expressed as a 
percentage of GDI of the household sector to measure the indebtedness of households (i.e. 
household leverage). GDI is also provided by the ECRI database. This measures the monetary 
income of households that can be used for consumption and saving. High leverage ratios are 
often interpreted as a sign of financial vulnerability. All aggregate household debt-related values 
have been deflated using IPC deflator (2010=100) and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
This adjustment ensures that our results are not affected by outliers. 
Our final sample covers 17 European countries (comprising Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) during the period 1995 – 2012. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of health outcomes, debt indicators, control variables and 
instrumental variables used in the empirical analysis. The first group of variables in Table 1 
present the health outcomes used in the present study. The empirical analysis presented in this 
study uses life expectancy at birth and premature mortality (all causes of death) as summary 
measures of health. Life expectancy at age 65 and alternative premature mortality indicators 
(such as acute myocardial infarction and mental and behavioural disorders) are used as a 
robustness check to ensure that our results are not affected by choice of health outcome measure. 
The average life expectancy at birth in our sample is 78.09 years (median value of 78.6 years). 
The average life expectancy at age 65 is 17.87 years (median value of 18.03 years). We also 
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examine cross-country variations in health using Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL) as a 
summary measure of premature mortality. The average values of PYLL from all causes of debt, 
acute myocardial infarction and, mental and behavioural disorders are 4,358.3, 204.7 and 70.18 
respectively.  
Turning to our measures of household debt, the average level of short- , medium- and long-
term unsecured aggregate household debt burden is 4.4%, 4.6% and 9.2%, respectively. 
Mortgage debt accounts for 52% of the disposable income of households (with values ranging 
from 19.9% in the 25th percentile to 65.4% in the 75th percentile) while the average aggregate 
household debt (overall consumer credit and mortgage debt) accounts for 71.5% of the aggregate 
disposable income of households.  
Specific country conditions can affect the general health of the population. Control variables 
are similar to those used in previous studies and include educational attainment, real GDP per 
capita, share of government expenditure in total health expenditure and alcohol consumption. 
The most widely accepted determinants of health are education and income. Education is 
measured as the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can read and write a short, 
simple statement on their everyday life. Education allows for more informed decisions related to 
health, so we expect a positive relationship with health. Real GDP per capita (deflated using 
GDP deflator: 2010=100) is used to control for income variation across countries. Higher income 
generally results in access to better health care, as well as better nutrition and improved access to 
housing schooling (French, 2012). At aggregate level, real GDP controls for differences in 
economic development across countries. We attempt to capture the provision, availability and 
equality of access of healthcare services in a country. To guarantee sensible international 
comparisons, we adopt an indirect approach and focus on the way in which healthcare is 
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financed, since this in turn will have an strong influence on the amount, quality and accessibility 
of services provided (Or et al., 2005). Therefore, in order to represent cross-country differences 
on the universal access to medical care, the share of public financing in health expenditure is 
used as a proxy indicator (Kennelly et al., 2003). A positive correlation between public financing 
and health is expected. These control variables are collected from the World Development 
Indicators published by the World Bank. Finally, we control by alcohol consumption, which is a 
well-known risk factor for health. We expect alcohol consumption to have a negative effect on 
health outcomes (Or et al., 2005). To account for general consumption of alcoholic beverages, 
we use litres consumed per head of population (aged above 15 years old) using data collected 
from the OECD health database.  
Finally, Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables used in the 
empirical analysis. The average credit provided to non-financial corporations by financial 
intermediaries represents 37.6% of the GDP. The level of market capitalization as percentage of 
GDP captures the size of financial system and has an average value of 47% while the average 
lending rate is 8.3% (the medians are 37.9% and 6.5%, respectively). We provide a rationale for 
our choice of instrumental variables below. 
 
Insert table 1 near here 
 Empirical Strategy  
We adopt a model consistent with previous literature where cross-country differences in 
health depend on country-level socio-economic variables and health behaviours (Jiménez-Rubio, 
2011; Kennelly et al., 2003; Or, 2000; Or et al., 2005). We expand a traditional health production 
function developed in the previous literature by introducing different types of debt indicators that 
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vary across countries and over time in order to test their impact on health outcomes. Our 
estimable log-linear model has the general form:  
 
 = 	 + 	
	 +	
 +  +  + 
 +  +  +   (1) 
 
where H is one of the following measures of health outcomes in country i and year t: life 
expectancy at birth and premature mortality, both in logarithm form. 
	 captures different 
indicators of household debt burden (i.e. expressed as a percentage of GDI) where k = (short-
term household debt to GDI; medium-term household debt to GDI; long-term unsecured 
household debt to GDI; mortgage debt to GDI; and total aggregate household debt (consumer 
credit plus mortgage debt) to GDI).  
 The model includes a vector of control variables (lagged one-period to minimize 
endogeneity concerns), which affect health outcomes such as real GDP per capita (GDP), 
alcohol consumption (ALCO) and public financing of health (PUB). We also control for the 
contemporaneous level of education (EDUC) since it is unlikely to be influenced by health 
outcomes. f denotes regional fixed effects (for Eastern Europe and Western Europe) which 
capture unobserved geographical characteristics constant over time, which could affect health. 
We also include a time trend (Ti) to capture any technological improvements over the time, 
which could contribute to general population wellbeing. ε is a stochastic error term. α is a 
constant term. β and δ are the unknown coefficients to be estimated. The subscripts i and t refer 
to country and time, respectively.  
An important assumption in our empirical design is that household debt may be 
endogenous to health outcomes. Household debt can be both a cause and an effect of poor health 
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outcomes, which implies a negative relationship between these indicators. Increasing levels of 
debt could arise from a greater probability of being ill or unhealthy. Poor health can induce 
households to take on additional debt and encourage unhealthy behaviours. Ultimately, a 
population in poor health can generate additional costs for healthcare. Good health status should 
accordingly lead to stable employment and income, and increase resilience in the face of 
unexpected negative health shocks. Regardless of the sign of the relationship, the potential 
endogeneity of household debt may bias our findings. To address this, we use the Generalised 
Methods of Moments estimator (GMM-IV) which allows for heteroscedasticity of unknown form 
(Hansen, 1982). GMM does not require distributional assumptions on the error terms. It is also 
more efficient than 2SLS because it accounts for heteroscedasticity (Hall, 2005). 
The instruments used in the present study are related to household debt. First-stage 
explanatory variables expressed as a percentage of GDP are credit to non-financial corporations, 
market capitalization of listed companies and the interest rate on loans. We use credit to non-
financial corporations given that credit extended to corporations is aligned with the provision of 
household debt over the business cycle. Stock market capitalization captures the size of financial 
system (“financial depth”) which could have a substantial effect on the provision of credit to the 
economy. Interest rates on loans capture the cost of the debt, which is likely to have a strong 
influence on the decision of households to take on more debt.  
We conduct endogeneity tests under the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous 
regressors can actually be treated as exogenous, where the test statistic is distributed as chi-
squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested (Baum et al., 2007). If 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS estimates are 
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more efficient and preferred to instrumental variable counterparts. In such cases, we report both 
sets of results.  
 We test for the relevance of the instruments or the endogeneity of debt using the first 
stage F-test for the joint significance of excluded instruments. We use the Hansen-Sargan test of 
over-identification to check instrument validity. Valid instruments must be correlated with the 
endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error terms (i.e. the unobserved differences in 
health outcomes). Rejection implies that the instruments are not valid (Baum et al., 2007; 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In addition, we report the Angrist-Pischke (AP) under-identification 
test, which tests whether a given equation is identified. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that excluded instruments are correlated with endogenous regressors. Both tests are 
useful to provide support for the validity of instruments employed. As the first-stage excluded 
instruments are pre-determined, it can be argued that the relationship between debt and health is 
at least partly causal. The exogenous component of aggregate household debt burden thus 
captures the unbiased impact on national health outcomes.  
 
4. Results  
Tables 2 and 3 present the main results of a regression analysis based on the estimation of 
health outcomes as specified in Equation (1) for two health indicators: life expectancy at birth 
and premature mortality (all causes of death).  
  
Insert Table 2 near here 
Insert Table 3 near here 
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For each health indicator, we present a set of five empirical models, which correspond to 
a reduced equation where health is a function of our proxies for household debt burden across 
different debt maturities. Since debt variables are expressed as percentage of disposable income 
and health variables are in logs, the regression results yield a straightforward interpretation of the 
impact of debt on health, our primary variable of interest. Result shows the percentage change in 
health outcomes for a percentage point change on aggregate household debt burden.  
Results in Table 2 show evidence that aggregate household debt burden is related to 
aggregate health outcomes. Specifically, we observe a positive relationship between short and 
medium-term debt and health outcomes, and a negative association between long-term unsecured 
debt, mortgage debt and health outcomes. In Table 2, the range of estimated coefficients for short 
and medium-term debt (Model 1 and 2) is between 0.303 and 0.324. That is a one percentage 
point increase in aggregate household leverage is associated with an increase of life expectancy 
at birth of between 0.30% and 0.32%, respectively. Model 3 provides results for long-term 
unsecured debt. The model is estimated via OLS since the null hypothesis of the endogeneity test 
cannot be rejected and instrumentation is unnecessary. Results show that higher levels of 
aggregate household debt burden are associated with worse health outcomes, but the economic 
impact is relatively small when compared to short and medium-term debt. In particular, a one 
percentage point increase in household debt is associated with a 0.075% decrease in life 
expectancy at birth. 
Table 3 presents the impact of aggregate household debt burden on premature mortality 
(all causes of death). Results are consistent with those reported in Table 2. Both short-term and 
medium-term unsecured debt appears to lead to lower levels of premature mortality. However, 
long term unsecured debt burden, mortgage debt burden and overall household debt burden 
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(aggregate consumer credit and mortgage debt as percentage of GDI) appear to exert a positive 
and statistically significant effect on premature mortality. To provide an economic interpretation 
to the results in Table 3, the estimates of aggregate household debt burden are compared to 
estimated coefficients of public financing on health, which are also measured in percentage 
terms. We observe that the predicted effect of debt on health is higher than the effect of public 
financing on health in the case of short-term debt. However, the impact decreases as the term of 
debt maturity increases. Specifically, aggregate household debt burden estimates vary between 
4.097 and 0.08, while public financing of health vary between 6.786 and 3.448, in absolute value 
terms. 
Overall, results show consistent empirical evidence that short and medium-term debt has 
a beneficial effect on health outcomes. This could be because households with greater access to 
short-term funds are able to respond quickly to unexpected health shocks. The negative results 
related to long-term unsecured debt and mortgage debt suggest that loans with longer maturities 
may make households more vulnerable to unexpected income shocks, and therefore lead to 
declines in health.  
Control variables exhibit the expected sign and are statistically significant at either the 
1% or 5% level depending on the estimated model. Previous research suggests that 
unemployment, lack of education, lower social class and income are associated with poor health 
(Arber et al., 2014). In a similar way, our results suggest that education, income and public 
financing of health lead to improvements in health outcomes, while alcohol consumption leads to 
a decline. Overall, the direction and magnitude of the estimates on the control variables are 
consistent with results reported elsewhere in the literature. 
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We extend the analysis to explore the effect of debt on alternative measures of health and the 
impact by gender. We introduce life expectancy at age 65 as an alternative health outcome which 
measures the number of additional years of life a person at age 65 will live on average (given 
current patterns of mortality). We also add two additional types of premature mortality measures: 
acute myocardial infarction, and mental and behavioural disorders. Table 4 reports the impact of 
debt burden on health outcomes as derived from the estimation of Equation 1. In order to 
conserve space, the coefficients on other covariates are not reported. Both the direction and 
magnitude of the estimates are consistent with results reported in Tables 2 and 3. Both short and 
medium-term aggregate debt burden are associated with better health outcomes. Short and 
medium-term debt exert a positive effect on health outcomes independent of gender and 
alternative measures of health. The estimates also suggest that the longer the maturity of the 
debt, the lower the impact on health outcomes associated with an increase in debt. The results 
presented in Table 4 also demonstrate that aggregate household debt is associated with larger 
improvements in health outcomes of males.  
 
Insert Table 4 near here 
 
To check the robustness of our results we carry out a series of robustness checks. First, we 
vary the definition of debt and health measures (See Appendix I, Tables A-E). We repeat the 
analysis above using the level of debt per capita. The results remain unchanged. We also analyse 
if previous results remain and different patterns are observed in countries characterized by 
financially distressed households (i.e. excessive levels debt burden) with respect their low-debt 
counterparts. We use an indicator variable that takes value one if household leverage to 
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disposable income ratio of country i in year t is above 75th percentile of the sample distribution in 
year t and zero if otherwise. Table F in Appendix I reports estimated coefficients of the 
percentage impact on health from a switch from 0 to 1 of the debt variable. That is the 
differential impact between countries with financially distressed households (debt burden higher 
than the 75th percentile in a particular year) and their lower debt counterparts. Overall, estimated 
coefficients keep the expected sign. Focusing on statistically significant coefficients, we observe 
that countries with high aggregate short-term household debt burden have higher levels of life 
expectancy at birth and lower premature mortality rates (all causes of death and mental and 
behavioural disorders) than those countries with relatively lower levels of aggregate household 
debt burden. Countries with a high level of medium-term aggregate household debt burden are 
associated with lower levels of premature mortality (all causes of death, acute myocardial 
infarction and mental and behavioural disorders) when compared with countries with lower 
levels of aggregate household debt burden. We also find evidence that countries with over-
indebted households in terms of long-term unsecured debt have lower life expectancy at birth 
and at 65, and higher probability of premature mortality (all causes of death and acute 
myocardial infarction). Finally, the results show insignificant point estimates for long-term 
unsecured debt burden, mortgage debt burden and total household debt burden. This suggests 
that countries with financially distressed households relying on this particular type of debt are 
not statistically different in terms of health outcomes from countries with low-debt burden levels. 
 Finally, we check for the robustness of the results by considering the effect of the recent 
financial crisis on health outcomes. We re-estimate all models including an indicator variable for 
the financial crisis, which is equal to one after 2007 and zero otherwise. Our results remain 
quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged. In fact, the coefficient for financial crisis is 
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statistically insignificant across all regressions (the results of robustness checks using the 
financial crisis indicator variable are not presented, but are available upon request). This also is 
consistent with recent findings of a non-relationship between economic decline and health 
(Catalano et al., 2011).  
5. Conclusion  
The level of household debt has important implications for the economy. Debt allows 
households to smooth consumption through fluctuations in income and general economic 
conditions. Given uncertainties over the timing of future consumption, debt can therefore 
improve economic welfare by allowing households to reduce liquidity constraints and increase 
consumption. To date, there have been very few previous estimates of the impact of aggregate 
household debt and its maturity composition on health outcomes. This is in large part due to a 
lack of appropriate data.  
Recently, a small literature has established an empirical association between household 
debt and health. This evidence is confined to single country settings, is reliant on subjective 
measures of both debt and health, and takes no account of debt maturity. Using cross-country 
data on both household debt and health for European countries during the period 1995-2012, this 
study moves beyond traditional socio-economic determinants of health to examine the 
relationship between aggregate household debt, aggregate household debt maturity and aggregate 
health outcomes. Instrumental variable models are estimated in order to control for the potential 
reverse causality between debt and health.  
The results of the empirical analysis suggest a negative and significant association between 
the maturity profile of the aggregate household debt burden and aggregate health outcomes 
across countries. Our results also suggest that both short and medium-term unsecured debt could 
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improve life expectancy and contribute to a reduction in premature mortality. These results can 
be explained by the fact that greater access to short and medium-term debt allows households to 
respond quickly to unexpected financial shocks, and consequently enjoy better health. However, 
long-term unsecured debt and mortgage debt appear to exert a negative effect on health outcomes 
since this leaves households vulnerable to future income shocks and puts health at risk. Policy 
initiatives that bring together health care professionals, debt advisers and debt collection 
agencies to support financially distressed households may mitigate some of these aforementioned 
effects. 
Overall, the results presented in this paper highlight the importance of household debt 
maturity in explaining differences in health outcomes across European countries. The use of 
standardized measures of health outcomes and different types of household debt allow us to 
identify empirical regularities across countries with respect to the relationship between debt and 
health, and compare our results with previous studies based on self-reported health measures in 
particular countries. What emerges is a nuanced picture, whereby short- and medium- term debt 
appear to be advantageous for population health, but longer-term unsecured and mortgage debt 
have deleterious consequences. 
Nonetheless, caution is required in drawing inferences about the impact of household debt on 
health outcomes. Our reliance on aggregate measures of household debt and health outcomes, 
alongside a limited range of confounders (constrained by comparable data availability), allows us 
to provide only an approximation of how country-level indicators of household indebtedness 
influence aggregate health outcomes across European countries. Further research might usefully 
extend the analysis within and between countries in order to gain a greater understanding of the 
role of household debt in determining health outcomes. In particular, the insights gained from 
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this study in terms of the importance of debt maturity suggest new avenues of investigation using  
diverse social science methods (such as  subgroup analyses, cohort studies, interview data) to 
untangle putative mechanisms. Finally, our aggregate measures of debt used do not allow us to 
disentangle the impact of different types of debt offered by mainstream (banks) and other forms 
of financial services firms (such as payday lenders) on health. Future work could aim to provide 
cross-country empirical evidence on these issues.     
Household debt is a corner-stone of modern market economies, and many policy choices 
either encourage or inhibit individuals from taking on that debt. Given the potentially important 
health consequences of debt (for individuals and in aggregate), and given the complex 
implications of debts of different types and maturities, greater research-based understanding and 
greater policy consideration are warranted. 
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Supporting Information 
Additional supporting information can be found in the Appendix I of this article: 
 
[Insert link to online Appendix I] 
 
Table A1: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by 
Maturities on Life Expectancy at Birth.  
Table B: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income of 
households) by Maturities on Life Expectancy at 65.  
Table B1: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by 
Maturities on Life Expectancy at 65. 
Table C: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by 
Maturities on Premature Mortality (All causes of death). 
Table D: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by 
Maturities on Premature Mortality (Acute Myocardial Infarction). 
Table D1: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income of 
households) by Maturities on Premature Mortality (Acute Myocardial Infarction). 
Table E: The Impact of Credit to Households (thousands of Euros per capita) by Maturities on 
Premature Mortality (Mental and Behavioural Disorders). 
Table E1: The Impact of Credit to Households (as a percentage of disposable income of 
households) by Maturities on Premature Mortality (Mental and Behavioural Disorders). 
Table F: The Impact of Over-indebtedness by Maturities on Health Outcomes. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable Code Mean Standard deviation P(25) P(50) P(75) 
Health 
outcomes 
Years of life expectancy at birth 78.092 2.581 77 78.6 79.9 
Years of life expectancy at age 65 17.873 1.498 17 18.025 19.05 
Potential years of life lost (all causes of death) 4358.371 1534.089 3437.2 3840.7 4695.6 
Potential years of life lost (acute myocardial infarction) 204.795 86.808 138.6 178 254.6 
Potential years of life lost (mental and behavioural disorders) 70.183 58.528 21.1 58.5 107.3 
Debt 
Indicators 
Consumer credit to disposable income (short-term) (%) 0.044 0.03 0.02 0.038 0.062 
Consumer credit to disposable income (medium-term) (%) 0.046 0.025 0.027 0.041 0.057 
Consumer credit to disposable income (long-term) (%) 0.092 0.063 0.046 0.082 0.127 
Mortgage debt to disposable income (%) 0.521 0.479 0.199 0.403 0.654 
Total household debt to disposable income (%) 0.715 0.532 0.356 0.618 0.888 
Control 
variables 
Education 98.526 2.129 98.4 99.7 99.8 
Real GDP per capita (thousand Euros) 25.675 13.761 15.796 27.064 32.426 
Alcohol consumption (Litres per capita) 11.467 1.826 10 11.8 12.8 
Public financing of health (%) 0.089 0.017 0.078 0.089 0.103 
 Credit to non-financial corporations (% GDP) 0.376 0.147 0.273 0.355 0.475 
Instrumental 
variables Market capitalization of listed companies (% GDP) 0.47 0.401 0.189 0.379 0.618 
 Lending interest rate (%) 0.083 0.221 0.033 0.065 0.085 
 
Notes: The sample of countries and data coverage for 17 European countries is as follows: Austria, 2001-2012; Belgium, 1995-2012; Czech Republic, 1997-
2012; Denmark, 2000-2012; Estonia, 1997-2012; Finland, 2003-2012; France, 1995-2012; Germany, 1995-2012; Greece, 1995-2012;  Hungary, 2003-2012; 
Ireland, 2003-2012; Italy, 1998-2012; Luxembourg, 2006-2011; Netherlands, 1995-2012; Portugal, 1995-2012; Slovakia, 2003-2012; Slovenia, 2004-2012. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Table 2: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income) by Maturities on Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  0.303***      
 
(2.67)      
Medium term unsecured debt  0.324**     
 
 (2.33)     
Long term unsecured debt   0.043 -0.075***   
 
  (0.38) (-4.76)   
Mortgage debt      0.020  
 
    (1.24)  
Total household debt      0.035 
 
     (1.57) 
Education 0.242*** 0.035 0.107 0.191*** 0.308* 0.415** 
 
(3.08) (0.50) (0.73) (2.81) (1.84) (1.99) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 0.003 0.014** 0.011* 0.017*** -0.013 -0.027 
 
(0.44) (2.52) (1.95) (2.87) (-0.70) (-1.12) 
Alcohol t-1 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 
(-5.92) (-5.29) (-3.51) (-6.02) (-3.61) (-2.95) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 0.479*** 0.688*** 0.356** 0.533*** 0.562*** 0.679*** 
 
(4.34) (4.34) (2.17) (4.93) (2.91) (2.76) 
Constant 1.775** 2.440*** 1.552 0.663 2.059* 3.225* 
 
(2.39) (2.98) (1.37) (1.35) (1.80) (1.90) 
Observations 188 174 177 177 188 184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.59 0.36 
Wald test 64.47*** 70.82*** 74.11*** 89.14*** 44.79*** 33.48*** 
1st stage F-Test  26.61*** 11.19*** 10.45***  5.68*** 4.19*** 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.32 (0.57) 0.14 (0.71) 7.01 (0.03)  3.14 (0.08) 0.96 (0.33) 
AP Chi2 (p-value) 55.90 (0.00) 23.60 (0.00) 33.23 (0.00)  11.93 (0.00) 8.81 (0.01) 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 20.61 (0.00) 4.71 (0.03) 0.40 (0.53)  10.85 (0.00) 17.32 (0.00) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income) by Maturities on Premature 
Mortality (All causes of death) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  -4.097***        
 
(-3.94)        
Medium term unsecured debt  -3.944**       
 
 (-2.39)       
Long term unsecured debt   0.634 0.484***     
 
  (0.76) (3.04)     
Mortgage debt      -0.055 0.082***   
 
    (-0.39) (4.97)   
Total household debt       -0.105 0.080*** 
 
      (-0.54) (5.19) 
Education -2.476*** 0.406 -1.344 -1.096** -1.078 0.835 -0.867 0.785 
 
(-3.17) (0.59) (-1.17) (-2.01) (-0.74) (1.51) (-0.45) (1.45) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 -0.060 -0.216*** -0.238*** -0.230*** -0.100 -0.323*** -0.105 -0.329*** 
 
(-0.89) (-4.84) (-6.23) (-5.72) (-0.57) (-6.70) (-0.43) (-6.86) 
Alcohol t-1 0.055*** 0.086*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.049*** 
 
(10.44) (7.09) (5.84) (10.46) (6.12) (10.67) (4.76) (9.80) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 -3.874*** -6.786*** -4.151*** -4.490*** -3.703** -3.448*** -4.638*** -3.477*** 
 
(-3.85) (-4.12) (-2.89) (-4.05) (-2.31) (-3.25) (-2.96) (-3.24) 
Constant 9.998 4.932 26.089*** 23.662*** 18.553** 27.330*** 15.606 27.938*** 
 
(1.52) (0.62) (2.89) (5.04) (1.97) (5.20) (1.14) (5.09) 
Observations 175 164 164 167 175 178 174 174 
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.70 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.70 
Wald test 58.49*** 53.33*** 73.95*** 89.21*** 41.27*** 71.64*** 46.83*** 60.05*** 
1st stage F-Test  24.93*** 9.44*** 6.71***  4.98**  1.72  
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 1.88 (0.17) 0.03 (0.86) 11.22 (0.05)  10.42 (0.00)  0.90 (0.02)  
AP Chi2 (p-value) 52.56 (0.00) 19.98 (0.00) 43.75 (0.00)  10.49 (0.01)  3.63 (0.16)  
Endogeneity test (p-value) 11.84 (0.00) 11.10 (0.00) 0.22 (0.64)  0.55 (0.46)  1.26 (0.26)  
 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income) by Maturities on Health Outcomes 
by Gender 
 
 
 
 Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Life Expectancy at 
65 
Premature Mortality 
 
All causes of death Acute Myocardial Infarction 
Mental and 
Behavioural 
Disorders 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term 
unsecured debt 
0.523*** 0.129 0.528* 0.221 -4.643*** -2.543*** -2.279 -0.468 -7.399** -6.547*** 
(3.46) (1.27) (1.71) (0.72) (-3.81) (-2.72) (-1.18) (-0.19) (-2.45) (-2.92) 
Medium term 
unsecured debt 
0.487** 0.180 0.304*** 0.249* -4.662** -2.373* -4.639*** -5.612*** -13.075** -10.938*** 
(2.49) (1.56) (2.66) (1.68) (-2.38) (-1.86) (-4.73) (-3.51) (-2.02) (-2.85) 
Long term 
unsecured debt 
-0.086*** -0.062*** -0.245*** -0.168** 0.528*** 0.424** 0.514 -1.780 -3.712 -12.031 
(-4.74) (-3.26) (-5.51) (-2.52) (2.94) (2.32) (0.32) (-0.97) (-0.40) (-1.29) 
Mortgage debt 
0.006 0.024 0.037 0.078 0.040** 0.161*** -0.078 0.208*** 0.060 0.213* 
(0.35) (1.46) (0.85) (1.35) (2.01) (8.77) (-1.64) (2.71) (0.42) (1.76) 
Total household debt 0.038 0.028 0.076 0.070 0.039** 0.155*** -0.058 0.219*** 0.119 0.235** 
 
(1.43) (1.44) (1.36) (1.12) (2.16) (8.90) (-1.23) (2.92) (0.88) (2.05) 
 
Note: For the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients of the debt variables. We follow the same methodology to estimate models reported in Tables 2– 6. 
Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  
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Does Debt Affect Health?  
 
Cross Country Evidence on the Debt-Health Nexus 
 
 
  
 
Highlights 
 
 
 
• We examine the relationship between aggregate household debt and aggregate health.  
 
• Short and medium-term aggregate household debt has a positive effect on health 
outcomes.  
 
• Long-term unsecured aggregate household debt and mortgage debt are associated with 
poorer health outcomes. 
 
• Our results hold for alternative measures of health and debt. 
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Appendix I. Supporting Information 
Table A: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by Maturities on Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  0.016***      
 
(2.68)      
Medium term unsecured debt  0.028**     
 
 (2.28)     
Long term unsecured debt   -0.002 -0.006***   
 
  (-0.24) (-6.89)   
Mortgage debt      0.002  
 
    (1.52)  
Total household debt      0.001 
 
     (1.40) 
Education 0.125* -0.129 0.216 0.300*** 0.289* 0.212** 
 
(1.90) (-1.18) (0.93) (3.83) (1.84) (2.40) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 0.015** 0.027*** 0.011** 0.029*** -0.009 -0.014 
 
(1.96) (4.71) (2.00) (5.15) (-0.39) (-0.83) 
Alcohol t-1 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.004*** 
 
(-3.33) (-3.76) (-2.80) (-2.86) (-2.07) (-3.54) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 0.654*** 0.993*** 0.432** 0.706*** 0.780*** 0.485*** 
 
(5.86) (4.82) (2.18) (7.04) (3.54) (3.14) 
Constant 3.201*** 4.841*** 0.976 1.958*** 4.325*** 1.752* 
 
(4.44) (4.43) (1.13) (3.62) (3.18) (1.79) 
Observations 194 180 177 183 194 184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.79 0.77 0.35 0.57 
Wald test 54.64*** 62.44*** 79.23*** 79.92*** 32.07*** 49.62 
1st stage F-Test  27.06*** 5.80*** 4.08***  4.93*** 3.05*** 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.87 (0.35) 0.10 (0.76) 7.83 (0.02)  1.92 (0.17) 4.38 (0.11) 
AP Chi2 (p-value) 56.76 (0.00) 12.20 (0.00) 12.98 (0.00)  10.34 (0.01) 9.68 (0.02) 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 19.31 (0.00) 8.77 (0.00) 0.01 (0.95)  12.84 (0.00) 12.87 (0.00) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income of households) by Maturities on Life 
Expectancy at 65 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  0.362       
 
(1.27)       
Medium term unsecured debt  0.015 0.276**     
 
 (0.05) (2.29)     
Long term unsecured debt    -0.305 -0.204***   
 
   (-0.92) (-3.86)   
Mortgage debt       0.063  
 
     (1.29)  
Total household debt       0.078 
 
      (1.29) 
Education 0.597*** 0.501** 0.338* 0.877** 0.639*** 0.956** 1.073* 
 
(3.09) (2.43) (1.88) (1.97) (3.03) (1.99) (1.91) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 0.006 0.009 0.025 0.018 0.029 -0.045 -0.060 
 
(0.31) (0.57) (1.44) (1.08) (1.58) (-0.85) (-0.93) 
Alcohol t-1 -0.003* -0.004 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.007* -0.010* 
 
(-1.82) (-1.25) (-3.16) (-0.35) (-1.34) (-1.89) (-1.72) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 1.147*** 1.276*** 1.361*** 1.523*** 1.390*** 1.612*** 1.700** 
 
(4.07) (3.44) (4.58) (3.10) (4.89) (2.78) (2.54) 
Constant -10.807*** -11.232*** -9.897*** -13.499*** -12.538*** -7.727** -5.954 
 
(-5.32) (-5.46) (-5.28) (-4.33) (-8.09) (-2.37) (-1.33) 
Observations 183 176 176 176 176 187 183 
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.51 0.40 
Wald test 87.40*** 101.24*** 100.29*** 113.82*** 105.06*** 55.50*** 45.25*** 
1st stage F-Test  28.99*** 11.91***  1.94  5.27** 3.73*** 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.45 (0.50) 13.32 (0.00)  6.01 (0.05)  0.09 (0.76) 0.04 (0.84) 
AP Chi2 (p-value) 60.98 (0.00) 25.10 (0.00)  6.17 (0.10)  11.07 (0.00) 7.84 (0.02) 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 26.44 (0.00) 0.46 (0.50)  0.05 (0.83)  28.10 (0.00) 30.47 (0.00) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B1: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by Maturities on Life Expectancy at 65 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  0.022       
 
(1.29)       
Medium term unsecured debt  -0.020 0.003     
 
 (-1.34) (0.49)     
Long term unsecured debt    -0.022 -0.018***   
 
   (-1.58) (-7.19)   
Mortgage debt       0.004  
 
     (1.31)  
Total household debt       0.005 
 
      (1.34) 
Education 0.446** 0.433* 0.373* 1.279** 0.940*** 0.804* 0.765* 
 
(2.21) (1.72) (1.77) (2.42) (4.15) (1.87) (1.85) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 0.042* 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.013 0.061*** -0.017 -0.032 
 
(1.94) (4.07) (3.99) (0.80) (3.67) (-0.26) (-0.42) 
Alcohol t-1 0.001 -0.004* 0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.52) (1.87) (0.16) (-0.06) (1.23) (-0.36) (-0.73) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 1.582*** 1.327*** 1.592*** 1.647*** 1.884*** 2.068*** 2.137*** 
 
(5.60) (3.45) (5.56) (3.95) (7.10) (3.34) (3.06) 
Constant -6.565*** -8.154*** -6.556*** -13.371*** -9.035*** -2.726 -0.864 
 
(-3.32) (-3.84) (-3.37) (-7.01) (-5.85) (-0.77) (-0.18) 
Observations 189 182 182 176 182 193 189 
Adjusted R-squared 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.38 0.23 
Wald test 77.48*** 97.94*** 98.20*** 120.69*** 120.81*** 40.43*** 30.77*** 
1st stage F-Test  29.03*** 9.44***  2.70*  4.57** 3.45*** 
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 1.62 (0.20) 8.50 (0.00)  4.06 (0.13)  0.07 (0.80) 0.10 (0.75) 
AP Chi2 (p-value) 60.97 (0.00) 19.87 (0.00)  8.58 (0.04)  9.59 (0.01) 7.25 (0.03) 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 19.77 (0.00) 1.72 (0.19)  0.48 (0.49)  23.60 (0.00) 27.20 (0.00) 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by Maturities on Premature Mortality (All 
causes of death) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  -0.202***        
 
(-4.00)        
Medium term unsecured debt  -0.226**       
 
 (-2.44)       
Long term unsecured debt   0.031 0.010     
 
  (0.53) (1.45)     
Mortgage debt      0.007 0.003***   
 
    (0.85) (3.18)   
Total household debt       -0.005 0.003*** 
 
      (-0.58) (2.90) 
Education -0.810 1.596 -1.561 -0.865 -1.257 0.404 -0.323 0.271 
 
(-1.51) (1.64) (-0.79) (-1.57) (-1.21) (0.76) (-0.34) (0.53) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 -0.052 -0.181*** -0.237*** -0.226*** -0.008 -0.295*** -0.109 -0.294*** 
 
(-0.80) (-3.72) (-6.21) (-5.63) (-0.04) (-5.79) (-0.49) (-5.72) 
Alcohol t-1 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 
 
(10.55) (7.55) (5.12) (11.05) (6.32) (10.69) (6.04) (9.96) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 -4.151*** -6.568*** -4.260** -4.140*** -3.905** -3.752*** -4.362*** -3.788*** 
 
(-3.89) (-4.33) (-2.27) (-3.71) (-2.56) (-3.43) (-3.63) (-3.44) 
Constant 11.422* 6.214 23.655*** 20.602*** 16.650** 25.050*** 17.561* 25.140*** 
 
(1.87) (0.86) (2.89) (4.17) (2.01) (4.74) (1.80) (4.53) 
Observations 175 164 164 167 175 178 174 174 
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.69 0.78 0.72 0.77 
Wald test 60.26*** 62.12*** 73.91*** 81.23*** 39.05*** 75.99*** 48.48*** 64.78*** 
1st stage F-Test  27.06*** 5.80*** 4.08***  4.93***  1.91  
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 1.59 (0.21) 0.07 (0.79) 11.11 (0.05)  8.95 (0.00)  0.00 (0.99)  
AP Chi2 (p-value) 51.54  (0.00) 14.53  (0.00) 24.03  (0.00)  9.51  (0.01)  4.03 (0.13)  
Endogeneity test (p-value) 12.17  (0.00) 8.14  (0.00) 0.26  (0.61)  0.89  (0.35)  0.93 (0.34)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by Maturities on Premature Mortality 
(Acute Myocardial Infarction) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  -0.095        
 
(-0.97)        
Medium term unsecured debt  -0.203* -0.246***      
 
 (-1.70) (-3.90)      
Long term unsecured debt    -0.140     
 
   (-1.18)     
Mortgage debt      -0.009 -0.001   
 
    (-0.79) (-0.37)   
Total household debt       -0.009 -0.000 
 
      (-0.90) (-0.10) 
Education -0.396 2.037 2.135* 4.809 -0.972 -0.031 -0.710 0.009 
 
(-0.32) (1.22) (1.72) (1.08) (-0.55) (-0.02) (-0.48) (0.01) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 -0.470*** -0.511*** -0.495*** -0.572*** -0.343 -0.533*** -0.340 -0.558*** 
 
(-3.34) (-5.21) (-4.77) (-5.35) (-1.17) (-3.96) (-1.25) (-4.08) 
Alcohol t-1 -0.039*** -0.019 -0.012 -0.016 -0.037** -0.039*** -0.030* -0.035** 
 
(-2.77) (-0.95) (-0.79) (-0.64) (-2.33) (-2.77) (-1.68) (-2.41) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 3.026 0.908 0.390 6.760* 2.105 3.046 2.062 2.889 
 
(1.54) (0.42) (0.18) (1.81) (0.98) (1.61) (1.02) (1.55) 
Constant 90.231*** 91.249*** 83.293*** 83.397*** 88.225*** 96.063*** 83.717*** 93.033*** 
 
(6.93) (7.21) (6.47) (4.21) (6.18) (7.72) (5.61) (7.27) 
Observations 175 164 167 167 175 178 171 174 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.59 0.58 0.38 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.53 
Wald test 42.33*** 47.95*** 39.85*** 41.03*** 43.58*** 41.70*** 38.01*** 34.94*** 
1st stage F-Test  24.44*** 6.86***  5.02*** 4.51**  4.44***  
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.33 (0.56) 0.80 (0.37)  1.57(0.46) 0.44(0.51)  0.34 (0.56)  
AP Chi2 (p-value) 51.54 (0.00) 14.53 (0.00)  16.00 (0.00) 9.51 (0.01)  9.38 (0.01)  
Endogeneity test (p-value) 6.15 (0.01) 0.22 (0.64)  2.87 (0.09) 0.47 (0.49)  0.77 (0.38)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D1: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income of households) by Maturities on 
Premature Mortality (Acute Myocardial Infarction) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  -1.956        
 
(-0.99)        
Medium term unsecured debt  -3.562* -4.763***      
 
 (-1.75) (-4.41)      
Long term unsecured debt    -0.415     
 
   (-0.26)     
Mortgage debt      -0.167 -0.027   
 
    (-0.75) (-0.53)   
Total household debt       -0.194 -0.008 
 
      (-0.90) (-0.16) 
Education -1.181 0.935 0.912 0.877 -1.502 -0.175 -1.777 -0.046 
 
(-0.71) (0.72) (0.75) (0.35) (-0.63) (-0.13) (-0.76) (-0.03) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 -0.474*** -0.538*** -0.526*** -0.575*** -0.361 -0.524*** -0.327 -0.554*** 
 
(-3.43) (-5.61) (-5.17) (-5.73) (-1.28) (-3.83) (-1.15) (-3.99) 
Alcohol t-1 -0.040*** -0.016 -0.006 -0.040* -0.036** -0.038*** -0.027 -0.035** 
 
(-2.85) (-0.78) (-0.42) (-1.87) (-2.12) (-2.71) (-1.32) (-2.37) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 3.169 0.584 -0.133 3.694 1.789 2.944 1.547 2.854 
 
(1.59) (0.27) (-0.06) (1.26) (0.74) (1.55) (0.67) (1.52) 
Constant 89.450*** 90.169*** 80.889*** 96.228*** 85.845*** 95.301*** 79.400*** 92.722*** 
 
(6.83) (7.03) (6.47) (5.52) (5.34) (7.70) (4.49) (7.31) 
Observations 175 164 167 164 175 178 171 174 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.53 
Wald test 42.50*** 48.16*** 41.21*** 49.69*** 43.72*** 42.29*** 38.70*** 35.06*** 
1st stage F-Test  24.93*** 9.44***  6.71*** 4.98**  3.96***  
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.29 (0.59) 1.01 (0.32)  7.22 (0.20) 0.55 (0.46)  0.38 (0.53)  
AP Chi2 (p-value) 52.56 (0.00) 19.98 (0.00)  43.75 (0.00) 10.49 (0.01)  8.37 (0.02)  
Endogeneity test (p-value) 6.40 (0.00) 0.58 (0.45)  6.56 (0.00) 0.35 (0.56)  0.71 (0.40)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (thousands of Euros per capita) by Maturities on Premature Mortality 
(Mental and Behavioural Disorders) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  -0.640 -0.304**        
 
(-1.11) (-2.13)        
Medium term unsecured debt   -0.745 -0.925***      
 
  (-1.15) (-3.53)      
Long term unsecured debt     -0.329     
 
    (-0.78)     
Mortgage debt       0.005 0.006   
 
     (0.08) (0.80)   
Total household debt        0.042 0.004 
 
       (0.62) (0.57) 
Education 10.318** 11.201*** 18.929*** 19.520*** 22.746 12.620* 11.623*** 8.986 11.984*** 
 
(2.54) (3.42) (2.74) (4.66) (1.46) (1.65) (3.29) (1.44) (3.38) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 2.366*** 2.198*** 1.944*** 2.160*** 1.964*** 1.936 2.075*** 2.991* 2.015*** 
 
(4.34) (7.36) (7.31) (7.97) (6.84) (1.38) (5.56) (1.87) (5.32) 
Alcohol t-1 0.300*** 0.283*** 0.389*** 0.391*** 0.371*** 0.304*** 0.283*** 0.324*** 0.279*** 
 
(8.04) (6.51) (6.33) (8.72) (4.57) (7.89) (6.35) (6.17) (5.97) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 1.942 2.755 -7.247 -7.286 6.811 -1.292 2.789 -1.239 3.325 
 
(0.22) (0.29) (-0.93) (-0.92) (0.54) (-0.16) (0.29) (-0.15) (0.34) 
Constant 9.535 45.245 -5.861 6.577 -8.249 29.842 55.638 9.101 60.806 
 
(0.27) (0.99) (-0.16) (0.16) (-0.13) (0.61) (1.17) (0.16) (1.22) 
Observations 170 177 163 166 166 174 177 170 173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.36 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.49 
Wald test 46.17*** 49.06*** 52.26*** 45.69*** 29.16*** 44.41*** 47.12*** 31.74*** 41.73*** 
1st stage F-Test  25.43***  7.01***  2.92* 4.58***  4.50***  
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.06 (0.81)  0.11 (0.74)  0.64 (0.42) 1.84 (0.17)  1.23 (0.27)  
AP Chi2 (p-value) 53.70 (0.00)  14.84 (0.00)  6.17 (0.05) 9.66 (0.01)  9.50 (0.01)  
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.47 (0.49)  0.27 (0.60)  4.23 (0.04) 0.06 (0.81)  0.19 (0.66)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E1: The Impact of Aggregate Household Debt (as a percentage of disposable income of households) by Maturities on 
Premature Mortality (Mental and Behavioural Disorders) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt  -12.544 -7.172***        
 
(-1.09) (-2.71)        
Medium term unsecured debt   -13.405 -11.114**      
 
  (-1.10) (-2.12)      
Long term unsecured debt     -6.725     
 
    (-0.75)     
Mortgage debt       0.280 0.062   
 
     (0.26) (0.48)   
Total household debt        -0.701 0.117 
 
       (-0.48) (0.94) 
Education 5.378 8.228** 15.047*** 13.402*** 19.453 14.809 12.903*** 5.741 13.350*** 
 
(0.69) (2.18) (3.39) (3.62) (1.63) (1.38) (3.39) (0.42) (3.41) 
Log (Real GDP per capita) t-1 2.312*** 2.226*** 1.832*** 2.004*** 2.028*** 1.708 1.863*** 2.859 1.774*** 
 
(4.53) (7.71) (7.26) (7.36) (6.76) (1.34) (4.91) (1.61) (4.62) 
Alcohol t-1 0.296*** 0.281*** 0.398*** 0.365*** 0.381*** 0.299*** 0.276*** 0.332*** 0.268*** 
 
(7.46) (6.39) (5.63) (7.43) (3.94) (6.90) (6.09) (4.59) (5.65) 
Public financing of health
 t-1 2.767 3.120 -7.961 -4.277 6.758 -0.828 3.725 -3.234 4.363 
 
(0.30) (0.33) (-0.95) (-0.48) (0.52) (-0.10) (0.39) (-0.33) (0.45) 
Constant 3.003 40.821 -10.707 19.835 -32.311 38.773 64.413 -2.023 72.712 
 
(0.08) (0.90) (-0.27) (0.46) (-0.35) (0.65) (1.34) (-0.02) (1.46) 
Observations 170 177 163 166 166 174 177 170 173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.31 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.49 
Wald test 46.79*** 50.27*** 49.37*** 45.76*** 30.10*** 46.36*** 47.92*** 29.97*** 43.62*** 
1st stage F-Test  26.63***  9.51***  2.56* 5.08**   4.03***  
Hansen-Sargan test (p-value) 0.10 (0.75)  0.07 (0.79)  0.68 (0.41) 1.72 (0.19)  1.25 (0.26)  
AP Chi2 (p-value) 56.25 (0.00)  20.13 (0.00)  5.42 (0.00) 10.71 (0.00)  8.50 (0.01)  
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.28 (0.60)  0.01 (0.91)  4.72 (0.03) 0.06 (0.80)  0.19 (0.66)  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All models include a time trend and control by regional differences. The Wald statistic 
tests the relevance of the variables in the model. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies explanatory variables matter. 1st stage F-Test is an F statistic for the 
joint significance of excluded instruments. The Hansen-Sargan’s statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) underidentification test is a test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., a rejection of the null indicates that the excluded 
instruments are "relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests are implemented under the null hypothesis that the specified 
regressor (i.e. debt-related variables) can be treated as exogenous. If the null of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is unnecessary and OLS 
estimates are more efficient. All variables have been winsorized at 1% from the top and bottom tails. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table F: The Impact of Over-indebtedness by Maturities on Health Outcomes 
 
 
  
Life Expectancy 
at Birth  
Life Expectancy 
at 65 
Premature Mortality 
VARIABLES All causes of death 
Acute 
Myocardial 
Infarction 
Mental and 
Behavioural 
Disorders 
Consumer 
Credit 
Short term unsecured debt 0.023* 0.043 -0.372*** -0.147 -0.479*** (1.88) (1.21) (-3.16) (-0.75) (-2.85) 
Medium term unsecured debt 0.001 0.007 -0.675* -0.310*** -0.638*** (0.27) (0.67) (-1.68) (-6.50) (-2.85) 
Long term unsecured debt -0.037* -0.045*** 0.088*** 0.402* -0.363 (-1.89) (-5.76) (4.09) (1.75) (-0.28) 
Mortgage debt 0.016 0.052 0.070 0.069 0.821 (1.42) (1.49) (0.10) (1.00) (0.65) 
Total household debt 0.029 0.071 -0.004 0.070 -0.194 
 
(1.36) (1.52) (-0.12) (1.11) (-1.47) 
 
Note: Over indebtedness is a dummy variable that takes value one if leverage to disposable income ratio of country i in year t is above 75th percentile of the 
sample distribution in year t, and 0 otherwise. For the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients of the debt variables. We follow the same methodology to 
estimate models reported in Tables 1 – 4. Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
